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equilibrium antitrust enforcement and compare it with the globally optimal antitrust 
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This paper analyzes international antitrust enforcement when multinational ￿rms op-
erate in several markets with antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with
how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is a⁄ected by the existence of col-
lusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. In the context of
international trade, it would be natural to assume that the products in each local market
are substitutes due to the possibility of arbitrage across markets.1 The interdependence of
collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforce-
ment across jurisdictions. We analyze the equilibrium antitrust enforcement and compare
it with the globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy.
To motivate our study, consider the "vitamin cartel" case of Empagran S.A. v. F.
Ho⁄man-LaRoche. In this case, Empagran S.A. in Ecuador and other foreign compa-
nies ￿led a suit against F. Ho⁄man-LaRoche of Switzerland and numerous other foreign
companies for an alleged international price-￿xing conspiracy. An interesting aspect of
the Empagran case is that it concerned a price-￿xing conspiracy that allegedly took place
overseas even though the case itself was ￿led in a US federal district court. Foreign plain-
ti⁄s, suing under the U.S. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), claimed
that "the cartel raised prices around the world in order to keep prices in equilibrium with
United States prices in order to avoid a system of arbitrage￿ and therefore that ￿ the foreign
plainti⁄s were injured as a direct result of the increases in United States prices even though
they bought vitamins abroad.￿ 2 In response, F. Ho⁄man-LaRoche moved to dismiss the
suit, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal antitrust
laws, because the injuries plainti⁄s sought to redress were sustained in transactions that
lacked any direct connection to United States commerce. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
also rejected the claim as there was no direct linkage between collusion in the US market
and collusion in the plainti⁄￿ s home country. Even if these claims were correct, the DOJ
argued, "they do not furnish a basis for jurisdiction under the FTAIA. To allow these claims
would con￿ ict directly with the rationales of the Supreme Court￿ s decision, creating many
1See Choi and Heiko (2009) for a general analysis of collusion in demand related markets that
encompasses both the substitute and complement cases.
2Empagran SA v. F. Ho⁄man-LaRoche, Ltd., 315F.3d 338, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
2of the very harm to international antitrust enforcement that the Court sought to avoid."3
This case illustrates interdependency of collusive behavior across markets and raises the
question about the sustainability of price ￿xing in demand-related (geographical or prod-
uct) markets. In particular, the underlying argument by Empagran and foreign plainti⁄s
seems to be that collusion in one market is easier to sustain if there is also collusion in a
related market. How does this argument actually work in theory? And does it depend, for
example, on the degree of substitutability (here transportation cost) or complementarity of
the products?
Furthermore, while looking at this argument is interesting in itself, it is obvious that
based on the results important policy questions could be addressed. If, for example, collu-
sion in one market is impossible without collusion in the other, then a targeted antitrust
enforcement in one of the two markets is su¢ cient to desist both cartels. However, this
possibility also raises the potential for a free rider problem in antitrust enforcement and
may call for coordination between antitrust authorities in di⁄erent jurisdictions if the en-
forcement is costly and the enforcement decision is made independently of each other.4
In contrast, if collusion is easier to sustain if the other market is more competitive, then a
global policy e⁄ort in all markets might be more e⁄ective compared to targeted enforcement.
To address these issues, we construct a model of multi-market contact with antitrust
authorities in each market and analyze the interplay of collusion incentives and antitrust
enforcement incentives. We characterize equilibrium in ￿rm behavior and antitrust enforce-
ment policy. In particular, we show that the equilibrium may exhibit a non-linearity in
antitrust authorities￿enforcement e⁄ort decisions as the global economy is more integrated
due to a free-rider problem. We also compare the equilibrium enforcement e⁄orts with
the globally optimum and show that the equilibrium enforcement e⁄orts are less than the
globally optimal ones. This result suggests for the need to coordinate enforcement e⁄orts
across jurisdictions.
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature on multi-market contact and an-
titrust enforcement. The multi-market contact literature is concerned with how contact
3Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellees, Empagran SA v. F. Ho⁄man-LaRoche, Ltd., No. 03-724 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f205300/205386.htm.
4For an empirical analysis on the spillover e⁄ect of antitrust enforcement, see Block and
Feinstein (1986).
3across markets can a⁄ect the degree of collusion that ￿rms can sustain in settings of repeated
competition. The idea was ￿rst proposed by Edwards (1955). Bernheim and Whinston
(1990) formalize Edwards￿idea that the multiplicity of contacts among conglomerate ￿rms
may induce "mutual forbearance" and "blunt the edge of their competition." They show
that multi-market contacts can be used as a mechanism to pool the incentive constraints
across markets. When there is slack in the incentive constraint in one market, the pooling
of the incentive constraints allows the slack to be transferred to the other market where the
constraint is binding, thereby aiding collusion in the market with the binding constraint.
A recent paper by Bond and Syropoulos (forthcoming) extends Bernheim and Whinston￿ s
model to an international context and explores the implication of reciprocal trade liberaliza-
tion for collusion and welfare. They consider symmetric international markets segmented
by trade costs in which ￿rms compete in Cournot fashion in their domestic and export
markets. However, both models are devoid of AA. As a result, the sustainability of collu-
sion in each market is only constrained by the internal incentives to cheat against collusive
outcomes. In contrast, we are interested in the interplay of AA￿ s external enforcement
and internal incentives to cheat and the sustainability of collusion requires overcoming both
internal and external hurdles.
Our paper also relates to the literature on cartel antitrust enforcement. In particular,
there is a small, but growing, literature on corporate leniency programs that analyzes the
e⁄ects of the programs on cartel stability. Motta and Polo (2003), for instance, conduct a
positive analysis of leniency programs in which ￿rms that reveal information about collusion
to antitrust authorities receive reduced ￿nes. They show that leniency programs make ex
post enforcement more e⁄ective but may have an adverse ex ante incentive e⁄ect that
encourages cartel formation by decreasing the expected cost of penalty associated with
collusion.5 Harrington (2008a), in contrast, investigates the optimal design of corporate
leniency programs. However, none of these papers deals with multi-market contact.
Notable exceptions are Roux and von Ungern-Sternberg (2007) and Lefouili and Roux
(2008). Roux and von Ungern-Sternberg analyze the impact of the so-called Amnesty Plus
and Penalty Plus on the incentives for companies to reveal their collusive conduct when
they are engaged in cartel activities in multiple markets simultaneously. At this point,
Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are features unique to the US corporate leniency program.
5See also Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006).
4They are proactive strategies aimed at soliciting information on cartel activities in markets
other than currently inspected ones. Roux and von Ungern-Sternberg (2007) show that
these programs strengthen ￿rms￿reporting incentives in the other market once the ￿rms
are prosecuted in one of the markets. However, their e⁄ects on the initial incentives to
apply for amnesty are ambiguous. The reason is that ￿rms may be reluctant to denounce a
cartel that would have been reported without these programs, if the initial revelation leads to
discovery of a second cartel, especially when the bene￿t from collusion in the second market
is very high. Their model, however, is static and does not investigate incentive constraints
to sustaining collusion in the ￿rst place, focusing only on the issue of ex post desistance.
Lefouili and Roux (2008) extend the analysis to investigate the e⁄ect of Amnesty Plus on
cartel formation. They identify conditions under which the program has the desirable e⁄ect
of weakening cartel stability. Otherwise, they show that the program is either neutral or
even stabilizes a cartel. However, neither paper analyzes demand linkages across markets
as we do in this paper. In addition, cartel enforcement is treated as exogenous in these
papers, whereas we endogenize enforcement decisions and address the issue of enforcement
externalities across jurisdictions in international antitrust enforcement.
The reat of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model
and ￿rst analyze the benchmark case in which competition authorities always pursue any
lead on collusive behavior in their own markets. Section 3 considers a simple model of
antitrust enforcement by introducing the cost of enforcement. We analyze the interplay
of collusion incentives and antitrust enforcement incentives. In section 4, we derive the
globally optimal enforcement decisions and demonstrate the potential for free-riding in the
enforcement e⁄orts when the decisions are made independently. Section 5 concludes and
suggests directions for future research.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the basic model of multi-market contact when markets are
linked through demand. We derive conditions under which collusion is sustainable in
each market, under the assumption that competition authorities always pursue any lead on
collusive behavior. The question of optimal antitrust enforcement policy is analyzed in the
next section.
52.1 Benchmark model: collusion with active competition authorities
Consider the benchmark case with two local markets j = A;B and two ￿rms, i = 1;2 selling
a homogenous product in both markets. Firms are engaged in a repeated game in which
they decide in each period whether to collude on the monopoly price in the respective local
market or whether to compete. 6 Firms have a common discount factor of ￿ and use eternal
grim trigger strategies that punish deviations in one or both markets with competition in
both markets. The linkage between the (otherwise symmetric) markets arises through
demand. For simplicity, let us use the following "reduced form￿ set-up. Let ￿11 and ￿10(￿)
denote the monopoly pro￿ts in market j if ￿rms in the adjacent market collude and compete,
respectively. The subscripts 1 and 0 indicate collusion and competition in each market,
respectively. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;￿ ￿] measures the integration of the two markets and/or
the transportation costs of the good. If ￿ = ￿ ￿, the markets are completely independent,
i.e. ￿10(￿ ￿) = ￿11. For lower values of ￿, competition in the adjacent market serves as
a competitive fringe for the cartel. More speci￿cally, the more integrated the markets
are, the more restricted is the pricing of the cartel, ￿0
10(￿) > 0. For ￿ = 0, the markets
are completely integrated, ￿10(0) = 0. If ￿rms compete in a market, local pro￿ts are zero
independent of whether the other market is collusive or competitive, that is, ￿01 = ￿00 = ￿0
=0.
There are three stages in the enforcement against cartel. First, price-￿xing conspiracies
need to be discovered. Second, discovered conspiracy schemes need to be prosecuted.
Finally, successfully prosecuted cases need to be penalized to break up the existing cartels
and deter any formation of future cartels. The ￿nal stage of punishment is captured
by a ￿ne imposed on successfully prosecuted cartel members.7 We assume that the ￿ne
for collusion is ￿xed by antitrust laws and we treat it as a ￿xed parameter value of the
model. As pointed out by Harrington (2006), the role of the antitrust authorities in the
discovery stage has been minimal in that they are typically a passive agent that responds to
complaints by disgruntled employees and suspicious customers who typically provide initial
leads on price-￿xing schemes. To re￿ ect this reality, we assume that if a cartel exists, AAs
receive information about the cartel with a probability of ￿ in each period. The information
6An analysis of partial collusion would require introducing demand functions but shouldn￿ t change
much of the qualitative results.
7In the US, punishment can entail both ￿nes and incarceration of executives that are responsible for
price-￿xing.
6provided to AAs is hard evidence and cannot be fabricated. In this section, we assume
that AAs always pursue any leads on cartel and engage in prosecution of cartel. In the
next section, we introduce a cost of prosecution and endogenize the prosecution decision of
AAs.8
With the assumption of active AAs, we can summarize antitrust enforcement mechanism
as follows. In each market and period an antitrust authority (AA) discovers and prosecutes
collusion with a probability of ￿. Assume that this prosecution probability is independent
across markets and over time. A convicted ￿rm pays a ￿ne of F(> 0). Once convicted ￿rms
do not engage in collusion any more and earn competitive pro￿ts in all subsequent periods.
2.2 Sustainability of collusion in one market only
Suppose ￿rms compete in one market, say market B. Then, the pro￿ts from collusion in










1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
Collusion is incentive compatible for both ￿rms if these pro￿ts exceed the pro￿ts from a




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿10(￿)
or
F ￿ F￿(￿) ￿
(￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1=2)￿10(￿)
￿
: (1)
Note that this condition is never satis￿ed for any positive ￿ne if ￿(1￿￿) < 1=2. In addition,
the threshold increases in the industry pro￿t ￿10(￿), i.e. the more industry pro￿ts, the easier
it is to sustain collusion. This implies that there is an externality across markets in the
sustainability of collusion when the two markets are linked by demand relationships. In
particular, as the two markets are more integrated (i.e., a lower ￿), collusion in one market
8As an alternative strategy of modeling the ￿rst two stages of enforcement, we can introduce
a cost of monitoring and endogenize the monitoring decision of AAs. This alternative modeling
strategy yields qualitatively identical results.
7is more di¢ cult to sustain when the other market is competitive. It will be useful later to
refer to condition (1) as a function of ￿. Condition (1) holds if ￿ ￿ ￿￿ where ￿￿ is implicitly
de￿ned by the equality of (1).
Let V10 be the value function of a representative ￿rm in one market when the other








1￿￿(1￿￿) , if F ￿ F￿(￿)
0, if F > F￿(￿)
2.3 Sustainability of collusion in both markets
The present discounted value of a ￿rm if collusion takes place in both markets is given by
V C
11 = ￿11 + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿V C




￿11 + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿V10 ￿ 2￿F
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 :
If no cartel is detected, collusion persists in both markets. If one cartel is detected, ￿rms
receive the present discounted value from collusion in the other market, V10, minus the ￿ne.






2￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1
2￿
￿11 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V10: (2)
Two cases have to be distinguished.
Case 1 F ￿ F￿(￿)
In this case, collusion in one market would still be viable even if the cartel in the other
market is discovered, that is, V10 = V C
10 =
￿10(￿)=2￿￿F




[2￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1][1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]









8The subscript C in the critical value F￿￿
C (￿) signi￿es that it is derived conditionally on
that collusion in one market is viable, that is, V10 = V C
10.
Case 2 F > F￿(￿)
In this case, collusion in one market cannot be sustained without collusion in the adjacent
market, i.e. V10 = 0. The incentive constraint for collusion in both markets is simply
F ￿ F￿￿
NC ￿





Once again, the subscript NC in the critical value F￿￿
NC signi￿es that it is derived con-
ditionally on that collusion is not viable in a single market, that is, V10 = 0: Note that
when collusion in the remaining market is not sustainable as cartel in the other market is
discovered, the threshold value for collusion in both markets (F￿￿
NC) is independent of ￿.
An examination of the three threshold values identi￿ed so far reveals the following
relationships.
Lemma 1 The relationships among F￿(￿); F￿￿
C (￿), and F￿￿
NC are as follows.
(i) For 1=2 < ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2, we have F￿￿
C (￿) ￿ F￿(￿) for all ￿ 2 [0;￿ ￿], with the equality at
￿ = ￿ ￿.
(ii) For ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 < 1=2 < ￿(1 ￿ ￿), we have F￿￿
C (￿) ￿ F￿(￿) for all ￿ 2 [0;￿ ￿], with the
equality at ￿ = ￿ ￿.
(iii) For ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 < 1=2 < ￿(1 ￿ ￿), there is a critical value of ￿￿￿ 2 (0;￿ ￿) such that
F￿(￿) ￿ F￿￿
NC if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿:
Proof. First, note that at ￿ = ￿ ￿, we have ￿10(￿ ￿) = ￿11 by the de￿nition of ￿ ￿. Thus,
F￿￿
C (￿ ￿) ￿
￿
[2￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1][1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2]
+
￿(1 ￿ ￿)





(￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1=2)￿11
￿
= F￿(￿ ￿)









C (￿) if 1=2 < ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2,









C (￿), which proves (ii). Statement (iii) comes
9from the fact that F￿(￿ = 0) = 0 < F￿￿
NC with ￿10(0) = 0; F￿(￿ = ￿ ￿) > F￿￿
NC, and F￿(￿) is
monotonically increasing in ￿ while F￿￿
NC is a constant as a function of ￿.
With the relationships among F￿(￿); F￿￿
C (￿), and F￿￿
NC, we can summarize the analysis
so far as follows.
Proposition 1 [Collusion Equilibrium if AAs Always Prosecute] Consider two
markets whose degree of integration is represented by ￿.
A. For 1=2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 (See Figure 1)
(i) If F ￿ F￿(￿); ￿rms always collude regardless of the status of collusion in the other
market (Region AC),
(ii) if F > F￿(￿) and F ￿ F￿￿
NC, there is collusion only if the other market is collusive
(Region CjC),
(iii) otherwise there is no collusion (Region NC).
B. For ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) (See Figure 2)
(i) If F ￿ F￿￿
C (￿); ￿rms always collude regardless of the status of collusion in the other
market (Region AC),
(ii) if F￿￿
C (￿) < F ￿ F￿(￿) , there is collusion only if the other market is competitive
(Region CjNC),
(iii) otherwise there is no collusion (Region NC).
C. If ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1=2, there is no collusion.
Proposition 1 re￿ ects the interaction between internal cartel instability and antitrust
enforcement. It identi￿es four possible cartel regimes which are illustrated in the (￿;F)-
diagrams in Figures 1 and 2. In region AC, the expected antitrust penalty is su¢ ciently
low to allow ￿rms to sustain cartels in all markets in which there has not been a successful
cartel prosecution. In region NC, the expected antitrust penalty is su¢ ciently high to deter
￿rms from colluding in any market.
Region CjC represents an area of conditional collusion where ￿rms can collude in a
market only when the other market is also collusive. In this region, ￿rms start colluding in
both markets simultaneously. If one of the two cartels is discovered, ￿rms stop their cartel
activity not only in the prosecuted market but also in the adjacent market. In other words,
cartel prosecution has a domino e⁄ect due to the negative demand externality from the
prosecuted to the non-prosecuted market. After the break-up of the cartel in one market,
10prices in the other market also drop to the competitive level. The reason for this result is
that the competitive outcome in the prosecuted market presents an arbitrage opportunity
and negatively a⁄ects cartel stability in the non-prosecuted market.
In region CjNC, antitrust intervention has the exact opposite e⁄ect. In this region, ￿rms
can collude in a market only when the other market is competitive. Cartel prosecution
thus entails a waterbed e⁄ect; successful cartel prosecution in one market triggers cartel
formation in the adjacent market. In this region, ￿rms can sustain collusion in only one
market. Firms start colluding in only one of the two markets, maintaining competition in
the adjacent market. If the cartel is discovered in the collusive market and the price drops
to the competitive level, ￿rms start colluding in the adjacent market. After the break-up
of the cartel in one market, prices in the other market increase to the collusive level.
Figure 1: Firms￿collusion incentives if both AAs always prosecute and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2:
CjC represents the area in which collusion is possible if the other market is also collusive.
11Figure 2: Firms￿collusion incentives if both AAs always prosecute and
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿). CjNC represents the area in which collusion is possible if the
other market is noncollusive.
The results in Proposition 1 can be explained in the following way. There are two rea-
sons for the break-down of collusion in this model: internal cartel instability and antitrust
enforcement. To sustain collusion in both markets, the incentive constraint for cartel sta-
bility, condition (2), has to be satis￿ed. Rewriting (2) gives
[
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 2]￿11 +
2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)V10 ￿ 2￿F
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 0:
A further simpli￿cation yields the incentive constraint of sustaining collusion per market,
[￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2]￿11 ￿ ￿F + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)V10 ￿ 0: (5)
The ￿rst term is the expected collusive surplus from one market if none of the two cartels
has been successfully prosecuted. This surplus is positive if the expected, discounted value
of not being caught in both markets is larger than the market share gain from deviation.
The second term is the expected penalty from collusion in this market. The third term is
the expected continuation value if collusion in the other market breaks down. This value is
12higher, the higher the transportation cost and the higher ￿10(￿).
To see the intuition for the existence of conditional collusion region CjNC, set F = 0.
In this case, collusion in one market is sustainable if ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1=2. For lower values
of ￿, the continuation value V10 is zero and the ￿rst term in (5) is negative. Thus, no
collusion is sustainable. If ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2, then the ￿rst term and the second term (since
￿(1￿￿) > ￿(1￿￿)2) are positive. Thus, collusion is always possible. Finally, for intermediate
values of ￿, ￿(1￿￿)2 ￿ 1=2 ￿ ￿(1￿￿), the ￿rst term is negative and the second positive, i.e.
collusion in both markets cannot be sustained without a positive continuation value V10.
This implies for ￿(1 ￿ ￿) towards 1/2, the second term approaches zero and the condition
is never satis￿ed. Thus, full collusion in both markets is not sustainable whereas collusion
in one market only is.9 The intuition for this result is that the incentive to deviate when
colluding in both markets is higher than the incentive to deviate when colluding in one
market only. However, the gains from collusion in both markets, i.e. ￿11, are curtailed by
the possibility of being caught in two (instead of one) markets. If the per period pro￿t of
collusion in one market, ￿10(￿), is su¢ ciently high, then the continuation value V10 is high
and this could make up for the reduced gains from collusion in both markets. However, if
￿10(￿) is small and the discount factor intermediate, then region CjNC exists.
3 Model of Antitrust Enforcement Decisions
3.1 A simple model of antitrust intervention
To ￿x ideas for the international trade model suppose that in each market there is an
antitrust authority (AA). Assume that each AA receives evidence of a cartel in their market
with an exogenous probability ￿, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. This probability is independent across markets
and over time. To convict the cartel with this evidence, the AA has to invest C > 0.
In other words, a successful prosecution of a cartel requires incriminating evidence and a
prosecution e⁄ort from the agency.10 Once a cartel has been prosecuted it will never be
9Also note that for F = 0, region CjC never exist. Either there are no externalities between AAs
of di⁄erent countries (regions NC and AC) or they are negative (region CjNC).
10The results should not change qualitatively with e⁄ort as a continuous choice variable, and/or if
the probability of a successful prosecution would be less than one. We can also derive qualitatively
similar results when we endogenize the AAs￿monitoring e⁄orts rather than assuming an exogenous
probability of detection.
13e⁄ective again.11
De￿ne S11, S10(￿) and S0 as the per period consumer surplus in a local market if there
is collusion in both markets, collusion in this market only, and no collusion, respectively. It
holds that
S11 ￿ S10(￿) ￿ S0
with S11 ￿ 0. It is natural to assume that S10(￿) is decreasing in ￿ with S10(0) = S0
and S10(￿ ￿) = S11.12 In words, local consumer surplus in a market in which ￿rms collude is
higher the lower the transportation cost, or the more integrated the markets are.13 Each
agency is assumed to maximize the discounted, expected domestic consumer surplus net of
its enforcement cost.
Let us start by assuming that the parameter constellation in the ￿rms￿problem is such
that ￿rms would always collude independent of whether there is collusion in the adjacent
market or not (i.e. region AC in Figures 1 and 2). After deriving the AAs￿optimal enforce-
ment strategies we check under which conditions this is indeed optimal ￿rm behavior given
the AAs￿strategies.
3.2 Enforcement Decision with Collusion in Only One Market
First consider a situation where there is collusion in only one market and cartel in the
other market is already broken up. Suppose the local competition authority has received
evidence of the cartel and has to decide whether to prosecute or not. To investigate the
AA￿ s optimal prosecution decision, let WP and WNP
10 (￿) denote the discounted expected
domestic consumer surplus (net of enforcement cost, if any) when the AA actively prosecutes
11This assumption is made for analytical convenience. For instance, AAs may closely
monitor the previous collusive industry. In addition, AAs may uncover inside informa-
tion on how the cartel operates in the process of previous investigation, which allows the
formation of a new cartel more di¢ cult.
12If ￿rms collude on the monopoly price pm and marginal costs are constant, the prohibitive level
of transportation cost is de￿ned by ￿ ￿ = pm ￿ c.
13Consider the simplest case of inelastic demand functions in both markets. Consumers value
each product at v; there is a marginal cost of c and transportation cost ￿. In this case the link
between the pro￿t and surplus functions is straightforward. We would have S11 = 0, S0=v￿c=￿11,
S10(￿) = v ￿ c ￿ ￿ and ￿10(￿) = ￿.









Prosecution is bene￿cial if WP ￿ WNP
10 (￿), i.e., the stream of future competitive con-












(S0 ￿ S10(￿)) ￿ C￿(￿): (6)
Note that C￿(￿) is increasing in ￿ with C￿(0) = 0: Thus, condition (6) is more stringent
to satisfy as ￿ becomes smaller. If the markets are su¢ ciently integrated, the gains from
stopping the cartel are low and the local competition authority prefers not to prosecute the
cartel. De￿ne ￿0 2 f0;￿g as the probability of successful antitrust enforcement by the local
AA if the adjacent market is competitive. Then the ex ante expected consumer surplus in
this market is recursively given by

































1￿￿ (S0 ￿ S10(￿)) ￿ C]; if C ￿ C￿(￿)
S10(￿)
1￿￿ , if C > C￿(￿)
14Note that prosecution leads to the competitive market outcome and thus the expected welfare from
prosecution does not depend on the status of collusion in the other market, which explains the absence of
subscripts and ￿ in the expression for W
P
153.3 Enforcement Decision with Collusion in Both Markets
Now suppose that both markets are collusive. First, consider the incentives for an equi-
librium in which both agencies prosecute their domestic cartel if they ￿nd evidence. The
expected welfare from prosecution is WP = ￿
1￿￿ S0 ￿ C as before, which is independent of
the other AA￿ s prosecution decision.
In contrast, the expected welfare from non-prosecution depends on the other AA￿ s pros-
ecution decision due to demand externalities across markets. We consider a representative
market i and denote the other market as ￿i. Let WNP
11 (￿;AA￿i) denote the expected
welfare from non-prosecution in market i when the antitrust agency in the other market ￿i
takes the action of AA￿i, where AA￿i = P;NP.
Assume the agency in the other market ￿i prosecutes whenever it ￿nds hard evidence.
Then the expected welfare from non-prosecution in market i can be recursively de￿ned as
follows.
WNP





(1 ￿ ￿)￿S11 + ￿￿W10
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
When both markets collude and the AA in the other market actively prosecutes (AA￿i =
P), the condition for active prosecution in market i is given by WP ￿ WNP
11 (￿;P): Note
that WNP
11 (￿;P) depends on W10, which in turn depends on the value of prosecution cost
C. Thus, we need to consider two cases.
Case 1 C ￿ C￿(￿)






1￿￿ (S0 ￿S10(￿))￿C] and it is straightforward to show that
WP ￿ WNP
11 (￿;P): This implies that if an AA would make e⁄ort after the other has
prosecuted its cartel, then it will surely prosecute when both markets are collusive.
Case 2 C > C￿(￿)
In this case, an AA is not willing to incur prosecution cost when the other has prosecuted
16its cartel, and we have W10 =
S10(￿)
1￿￿ : Then WP ￿ WNP




(S0 ￿ S10(￿)) +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(S10(￿) ￿ S11) (7)
= C￿(￿) +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(S10(￿) ￿ S11) ￿ C￿￿(￿;P) (8)
Since C￿￿(￿;P) > C￿(￿), we have the following result. If C ￿ C￿￿(￿;P), then there
exists an equilibrium in which both agencies make a prosecution e⁄ort after detecting the
cartel. Two subcases can arise. If additionally C ￿ C￿(￿) holds, then an agency continues
prosecution after the other agency was successful. If C ￿ C￿(￿) does not hold, an agency
stops the prosecution once the other agency is successful. Note that the C￿￿(￿;P) is in-
creasing in ￿. Thus, the more integrated the markets (or the lower transportation cost),
the harder it is to sustain an equilibrium in which both agencies prosecute their domestic
cartel.
Next consider the conditions under which there is an equilibrium in which no AA makes
a prosecution e⁄ort. Suppose both markets are collusive and the AA in market B makes no
prosecution e⁄ort after detection. In such a case, collusion in both markets will perpetuate
without any prosecution in market A. Thus, the expected welfare from non-prosecution






Non-prosecution is optimal if and only if WNP











(S0 ￿ S11) ￿ C￿￿(NP) (10)
Note that the critical value C￿￿(NP) does not depend on ￿. It follows straight from (7)
and (10) that C￿￿(NP) ￿ C￿￿(￿;P) with the equality holding at ￿ = ￿. It is immediate
that for intermediate values of C, C￿￿(￿;P)￿ C ￿C￿￿(NP), two asymmetric equilibria
(and a mixed-strategy equilibrium) exist in which exactly one AA exerts prosecution while
the other one does not. Let us summarize this analysis in the following proposition.
17Proposition 2 [Locally Optimal Prosecution Decisions if Firms Always Col-
lude]:
(i) If C ￿ C￿(￿); there is prosecution by both AAs whenever there is hard evidence.
(ii) If C￿(￿) < C ￿ C￿￿(￿;P); there is prosecution by both AA when the other market is
also collusive, but not if the other market is competitive.
(iii) If C￿￿(￿;P) < C ￿ C￿￿(NP); there is prosecution by one AA when the other market
is also collusive and the other AA does not prosecute.
(iv) If C > C￿￿(NP); there is no prosecution by either AA.
To derive this result we have assumed that ￿rms collude independent of whether the
adjacent market is collusive or competitive. Let us now check whether this is indeed optimal
￿rm behavior. To narrow down all the cases to consider and illustrate the interplay between
collusive behavior and antitrust enforcement decisions, we focus on the parameter space
de￿ned by
0 ￿ F ￿ F￿￿
NC =





which is satis￿ed for a low penalty F and a low detection rate ￿ and a high discount factor
￿. This constraint is a su¢ cient condition for collusion in both markets not being deterred
even if both AAs prosecute whenever there is evidence.
Two di⁄erent cases arise with this assumption. First, if C ￿C￿(￿), then prosecution
stops in one market as soon as the other market is competitive. This in turn implies that
￿rms receive a higher continuation value, V10 = (￿10=2)=(1￿￿), than in region CjC of Figure
1, where collusion is conditional. In region CjC collusion in one market breaks down when
the adjacent market becomes competitive. However, if (11) holds, collusion is sustainable in
region CjC if the adjacent market is collusive, and hence collusion in both markets is always
sustainable if prosecution stops when one market becomes competitive. This argument
holds for the case where both AAs prosecute (i.e. C￿(￿)< C ￿C￿￿(￿;P)) and, a fortiori, for
higher values of C with less prosecution of both cartels. Thus, the prosecution equilibrium
described in Proposition 2 is consistent with a ￿rms￿equilibrium in which collusion persists
in a local market independent of whether the adjacent market is collusive or competitive.
Figure 3 depicts the antitrust enforcement equilibrium in the (￿;C) space. Regions D, E,
F correspond to this ￿rst case.
In the second case, 0 ￿ C <C￿(￿), both AAs prosecute whenever there is evidence. This
18is exactly the assumption behind our analysis of the ￿rms￿behavior above (i.e. Proposition
1). Collusion is detected and prosecuted with a probability ￿ at all times. And, as shown
above, if ￿ ￿ ￿￿, then ￿rms collude independent of whether the adjacent market is collusive
or competitive. Thus, in region B of Figure 3 ￿rms always collude and AAs always prosecute.
In contrast, if ￿ <￿￿, then after successfully prosecuting one market, collusion in the
adjacent market is deterred and breaks down. In this case, our initial assumption to derive
the AAs￿prosecution equilibrium, i.e. ￿rms colluding no matter what, is no longer valid. Let
f WNP
11 (P) be the expected welfare from non-prosecution in market i that re￿ ects the domino
e⁄ect when the antitrust agency in the other market ￿i takes the action of AA￿i = P given
any lead.
What is the AAs￿prosecution equilibrium in this case? First, note that the condition
for an equilibrium with no prosecution from either AA does not change, i.e. C ￿C￿￿(NP).
Then consider the condition for an equilibrium in which both AAs prosecute. The break-
down of collusion increases the continuation value with a competitive adjacent market to
S0=(1￿￿). Thus, given the other AA prosecutes, not prosecuting hard evidence now yields
f WNP
11 (P) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[S11 + f WNP






￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)S11 + ￿￿S0
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
(￿ WNP
11 (￿;P)):









1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(S0 ￿ S11) ￿ e C￿￿(P):
Note that e C￿￿(P) is independent of ￿ and e C￿￿(P) ￿ C￿￿(￿;P), with the equality holding
at ￿ = 0.
19Area Firm Behavior AA Behavior
A CjC (Conditional Collusion) Always Enforce
B AC (Always Collude) Always Enforce
C CjC (Conditional Collusion) Only One Prosecutes When Both Markets Collusive
D AC (Always Collude) Both AAs Enforce Only When Both Markets Collusive
E AC (Always Collude) Only One Prosecutes When Both Markets Collusive
F AC (Always Collude) No Enforcement
Figure 3: Antitrust Enforcement Equilibrium
.
Thus, in region A of Figure 3, both AAs prosecute if the adjacent market is collusive.
When one cartel has been successfully prosecuted, the local AA in the collusive market
20would prosecute the cartel if detected. This is anticipated by the ￿rms and the cartel
breaks down. In region B both AAs always prosecute collusion and ￿rms collude until they
are caught. Finally, as indicated in Figure 3, there might also exist a region C. De￿ne the
intersection value of C￿(￿) and e C￿￿(P) as e ￿, i.e.
S10(e ￿) = S11 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(S0 ￿ S11):
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for region C to exist is e ￿￿ ￿￿ which holds for ￿
su¢ ciently high. In region C, only one AA prosecutes if there is collusion in both markets.
If successful, collusion in the other market breaks down because ￿rms anticipate that the
local AA would prosecute any hard evidence. What is interesting about this region is that it
introduces a non-linearity in the e⁄ort equilibrium of the AA. Consider a situation in which
both markets are collusive. For e ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, both AAs prosecute if the cost of prosecution
is low or medium-to-high (more precisely, if C lies in regions A or D, that is, C < e C￿￿(P)
or C￿(￿) < C < C￿￿(￿;P)). However, One AA prosecuting is an equilibrium for low-
to-medium C (more precisely, region C where e C￿￿(P) < C < C￿(￿)). The reason is that
for low to medium C, the cost of prosecution is low enough that a local AA can credibly
commit to prosecute even if the other market is competitive. Therefore, collusion breaks
down in a cascade: if one market is caught, the other one becomes competitive, too. This
in turn, increases the free-rider problem for low C. In the Appendix, we show that such
region C exists if ￿ is su¢ ciently large. The graph and table in Figure 3 summarize the
conditions for the AAs￿prosecution e⁄ort equilibrium.
Alternatively, we can also derive a non-linearity result in enforcement equilibrium as we
change ￿. Consider the e⁄ect of globalization on antitrust e⁄orts. We model globalization
as a decrease in ￿. Suppose that the cost of prosecution is just above C￿￿(￿;P) and initially
￿ is close to ￿. Then, as the two markets become more integrated and ￿ decreases, we
mover from area B to C to D. Once again, the antitrust equilibrium changes from both AAs
enforcing to only one AA enforcing to both AAs enforcing when both markets are collusive.
4 Globally Optimal Antitrust Decisions
In section 3, we analyzed the equilibrium antitrust enforcement decisions when both AAs
act independently to maximize their respective domestic consumer surplus net of enforce-
21ment costs. However, the demand linkage across markets suggests that the enforcement
equilibrium is not necessarily optimal from the global welfare viewpoint. In particular,
cartel enforcement in one country can exert positive externalities by putting downward
pressure on the highest collusive price sustainable in the other market and make collusion
less desirable. As a result, there will be less enforcement in the equilibrium compared to
the globally optimal level of enforcement.
To compare the equilibrium enforcement levels to the globally optimal one, we assume
that there is no information sharing between the two AAs in deriving the globally opti-
mal one. In other words, we consider the informationally constrained globally optimum
policy in which each AA makes a decision without knowing whether the other agent pos-
sesses information that can lead to prosecution in the other market. The next proposition
summarizes the globally optimal enforcement policy assuming that ￿rms always collude.
Proposition 3 [Globally Optimal Prosecution if ￿rms always collude]: The fol-
lowing characterizes the globally optimal antitrust policy where C￿￿
G (￿;P) > C￿￿(￿;P) and
C￿￿
G (￿;NP) > C￿￿(NP), which implies that there is too little enforcement e⁄orts by AAs in
equilibrium compared to the global optimum.
(i) If C ￿ C￿(￿); there should be prosecution by both AA whenever there is hard evidence.
(ii) If C￿(￿) < C ￿ C￿￿
G (￿;P); there should be prosecution by both AA when the other
market is also collusive, but not if the other market is competitive.
(iii) If C￿￿
G (￿;P) < C ￿ C￿￿
G (￿;NP); there should be asymmetric prosecution when both
markets are collusive, with one AA actively prosecuting and the other not prosecuting.
(iv) If C > C￿￿
G (￿;NP); no prosecution by either AA is globally optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed collusion incentives of multinational ￿rms interacting in
several local markets that are linked by substitute products in demand due to the arbitrage
constraint across markets. Our focus was on how collusion incentives in one market can
be in￿ uenced by competitive conditions in the other market. We have shown that this has
implications for optimal antitrust enforcement decisions for each AA in charge of di⁄erent
local markets.
22There are many unresolved issues. For instance, we have analyzed only the substi-
tute product case in this paper since it is a natural setting in the context of international
trade. However, our preliminary investigation [Choi and Gerlach (2009)] suggests that
a very di⁄erent picture emerge in terms of collusion and antitrust enforcement incentives
in the case of complementary products. In addition, we have assumed that there is no
information sharing between local antitrust authorities in the enforcement. In reality, how-
ever, investigation of cartel in one market often leads to additional pieces of evidence on
cartel in other markets. In fact, one of the global initiatives in the ￿ght against interna-
tional cartel is to promote information sharing among antitrust agencies across di⁄erent
jurisdictions. Information sharing confers many bene￿ts. For instance, timely sharing of
critical information allows much more e⁄ective enforcement through coordinated searches
and simultaneous dawn raids. However, many business groups have opposed information
sharing in cartel investigations on the ground that it will undermine the e¢ cacy of leniency
programs, which have been one of the most e⁄ective instruments in the ￿ght against cartels.
Their argument against information sharing is that con￿dentiality is a necessary induce-
ment to encourage leniency applications and restricting information sharing is necessary
to protect the integrity of leniency programs. How information sharing among antitrust
agencies plays out for the enforcement of international cartel can be an important issue in
conjunction with the leniency programs in place. We plan to pursue these issues in our
companion paper [Choi and Gerlach (in preparation)].
23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. When there is collusion in only one market and cartel in the
other market is already broken up, there is no externality from cartel enforcement in the
remaining market. Therefore, the optimal policy in the remaining market is also globally
optimal, which means that there should be prosecution if and only if WP ￿ WNP
10 (￿), i.e.,
C ￿ C￿(￿).
Now we analyze globally optimal enforcement decisions when both markets are collusive.
Once again, it is straightforward to show that if C ￿ C￿(￿) and an AA would make e⁄ort
after the other has prosecuted its cartel, then it is not only domestically optimal but also
globally optimal to prosecute when both markets are collusive regardless of the action of
the other AA. From now on, I focus on the parameter region in which C > C￿(￿) and the
enforcement is not carried out when the other market is competitive.
Let GWP(AA￿i) denote the expected global welfare from prosecution in the represen-
tative market i when the antitrust agency in the other market ￿i takes the action of AA￿i
without any information sharing, where AA￿i = P;NP. In other words, GWP(AA￿i) =
WP + WP
￿i(AA￿i), where WP
￿i(AA￿i) denotes the other country￿ s welfare when country i
prosecutes while the other country ￿i takes the action of AA￿i.
To derive the condition under which it is globally optimal for both ￿rms prosecute,
consider the incentive for an AA to prosecute assuming that the other AA also actively
pursue prosecution without any information sharing. The expected global welfare (GW)
from prosecution is given by
GWP(P) = WP + WP
￿i(P);
where WP
￿i(P) denotes the other country￿ s welfare when the other country also actively









The expression above utilizes the fact that AA￿i will not engage in prosecution once
market i is competitive. In contrast, if the country does not prosecute while the other one
24does, the expected global welfare from non-prosecution is given by
GWNP(P) = WNP
11 (￿;P) + WNP
￿i (P);
where WNP
￿i (P) denotes the other country￿ s welfare when the other one is the only one
that actively pursues prosecution (i.e., AAi = NP and AA￿i = P). The value for WNP
￿i (P)
is recursively de￿ned by
WNP
￿i (P) = ￿[
￿
1 ￿ ￿






1￿￿ S0 ￿ C] + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)S11




S0 ￿ C] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿[ ￿
1￿￿ S0 ￿ C] + S11
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
It is globally optimal for both countries to actively engage in prosecution if GWP(P) ￿





I ￿rst show that the externality term is always positive for C > C￿(￿). To see this,
note that when AA￿i = P, the externality arises only in the event that the other country￿ s
AA does not receive any evidence. Otherwise, AA￿i will engage in prosecution and the
market will be competitive regardless of the action by AAi. Thus,
EP(P) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
S10(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿[ ￿
1￿￿ S0 ￿ C] + S11
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
For C > C￿(￿) = ￿
1￿￿ (S0 ￿ S10(￿)), we have
EP(P) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿
S10(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿[ ￿
1￿￿ S10(￿)] + S11
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
=
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
[S10(￿) ￿ S11] ￿ 0
Using the de￿nition of EP(P), the condition for GWP(P) ￿ GWNP(P) can be rewritten
as
C ￿ C￿￿(￿;P) + EP(P)
25Notice that C￿￿(￿;P) is a constant and EP(P) is an increasing function of C. Let us
de￿ne ￿(C) = C￿￿(￿;P) + EP(P). Then, ￿(C) is an increasing function of C with the
slope of
￿
1￿￿(1￿￿) < 1: Therefore, there is a unique C￿￿
G (￿;P) such that C ￿ ￿(C) if and
only if C ￿ C￿￿
G (￿;P). We know that C￿￿(￿;P) ￿ ￿(C￿￿(￿;P)) because EP(P) evaluated
at C￿￿(￿;P) (>C￿(￿)) is positive. Therefore, C￿￿
G (￿;P) > C￿￿(￿;P):
By proceeding in a similar way, we can also derive the condition under which it is
globally optimal for neither ￿rms prosecute. Consider the incentive for an AA to prosecute
assuming that the other AA does not actively pursue prosecution. The expected global
welfare (GW) from prosecution can be written as
GWP(NP) = WP + WP
￿i(NP);
where WP
￿i(NP) denotes the other country￿ s welfare when the other country does not






Once again, the expression above utilizes the fact that AA￿i will not engage in pros-
ecution when market i is competitive. In contrast, if both AAs do not pursue active
prosecution, the expected global welfare is given by
GWNP(NP) = WNP
11 (￿;NP) + WNP
￿i (NP);
where WNP
￿i (NP) denotes the other country￿ s welfare when neither of them pursues
prosecution (i.e., AAi = NP and AA￿i = NP). Since cartel is never broken up in both
countries, we have
WNP





It is globally optimal for neither county to actively engage in prosecution if GWNP(NP) ￿








26It is immediate to see that GWNP(NP) ￿ GWP(NP) if and only if C ￿ C￿￿
G (￿;NP) ￿
C￿￿(NP) + EP(NP) = ￿
1￿￿[S0 ￿ S11] + ￿
1￿￿[S10(￿) ￿ S11]. Thus, it is globally optimal for
neither ￿rm to engage in prosecution if C ￿ C￿￿
G (￿;NP), where C￿￿
G (￿;NP) > C￿￿(￿;NP).
If C is in the intermediate range of [C￿￿
G (￿;P);C￿￿
G (￿;NP)], asymmetric prosecution in
which only one country prosecutes is globally optimal.
Existence of region C: Suppose ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2. If ￿ is su¢ ciently large, then there
always exist (F;￿) such that e ￿<￿￿.
Proof:
Assume
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1=2: (A)
￿￿ is de￿ned by
￿10(￿￿) =
￿F
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1=2
:
Since ￿￿ increases in F, the maximum ￿￿, ￿ ￿￿, compatible with (11) is given by
￿10(￿ ￿￿) =
￿F￿￿ jV10=0
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1=2
=
2￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1
2￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1
￿11 ￿  1￿11:
Check that  1 increases in ￿ with  1(￿ = 1=[2(1 ￿ ￿)2]) = 0 and 0 ￿  1(￿ = 1) ￿ 1 as
long as (A) holds. Since ￿10(￿) increases in ￿ with ￿10(0) = 0 and ￿10(￿ ￿) = ￿11, it follows
that ￿ ￿￿ increases in ￿ and takes value 0 at ￿ = 1=[2(1 ￿ ￿)2] and value ￿￿0 at ￿ = 1 where
0 ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿.
e ￿ is de￿ned by
S10(e ￿) = S11 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(S0 ￿ S11) ￿  2:
Check that  2 increases in ￿ with  2(￿ = 1=[2(1 ￿ ￿)2]) > S11 and  2(￿ = 1) = S0. Since
S10 decreases in ￿ with S10(0) = S0 and S10(￿ ￿) = S11, it follows that e ￿ decreases in ￿ and
takes a strictly positive value at ￿ = 1=[2(1 ￿ ￿)2] and value 0 at ￿ = 1.
Suppose ￿10(￿) and S10(￿) are continuous in ￿. Then there exists a unique value e ￿ with
1=[2(1 ￿ ￿)2] < e ￿ < 1 such that if ￿ ￿ e ￿, then ￿ ￿￿￿ e ￿. It follows that if ￿ ￿ e ￿, then there
exists F ￿ F￿￿ jV10=0 such that ￿￿ ￿ e ￿.
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